Fish resources are managed by the authorities in order to achieve sustainable development of the fish stocks. In the EU, illegal catches have long been a serious management problem (Holden, 1996) , and fisheries managers consider ways to improve fishermen's compliance with regulations. Evaluating motivation is important as a step towards preventing illegal behaviour. Non-compliance, for example, might be a result of lack of enforcement and punishment (Becker, 1968; Sutinen and Andersen, 1985) . Lack of perceived fairness and appropriateness of the regulations may also play a role in motivating non-compliance (Tyler, 1990; Jentoft, 1989; Nielsen 2003) . In any case, it is vital that the authorities should understand the motives that cause illegal behaviour in their search for effective policies to prevent non-compliance.
The literature on compliance in fisheries addresses economic, social behavioural, legitimacy, and moral factors for non-compliance (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Hatcher et al, 2000; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003; Jentoft, 2000; Hønneland, 1999) .
A shortcoming of the existing literature is that technological reasons for noncompliance have scarcely been addressed at all. Squires, (1987) , Kirkley and Strand (1988) , Dupont (1991) Squires and Kirkley (1991, 1996) , Jensen (2002) address that constraints of fishing technology have consequences for obtaining successful management in multispecies fishery. In this view the characteristics of fishing gears impose restriction on the fishermen's ability to comply with regulation. Gill net and trawl, for example, are often inappropriate for the selective harvesting of demersal species (Kirkley and Strand, 1988; Alam, Ishak and Squires, 1996, 2002) , and the technological ability to harvest selectively has implications for the ability to obey by- The study makes two contributions to the literature. First, competing explanations that have their roots in different paradigms are tested for their contribution for explaining non-compliance among fishermen. Secondly, technological problems that create incentives for infringements are explicitly tested for, which to the best of our knowledge is a topic that has not been addressed before. We perform an empirical analysis of the motives for non-compliance, based on fishermen's choices among alternative explanations of why the regulations are violated. A multinomial logit model is used to analyse the responses of the fishers. The objective is to identify ways for the authorities to reduce non-compliance. The following section reviews a number of theories regarding the motivation of non-compliance behaviour. The empirical model used to analyse the motives for non-compliance is outlined in section III. Data and empirical results are presented in sections IV and V. A discussion of the findings and some policy implications for reducing non-compliance are presented in the final section.
II. MOTIVES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Several scholars have carried out empirical analyses of non-compliance among fishermen (e.g. Sutinen, Rieser and Gauvin, 1990; Furlong, 1991; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Hatcher et al., 2000 Hatcher et al., , 2005 Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003) . A review of the literature shows that several theories are used for explaining non-compliance in fisheries, the theories are founded on different paradigms employed for explaining human behaviour and have origins in research fields of economics (Becker, 1968) , psychology (Kohlberg, 1976) Different motives for non-compliance behaviour are outlined in a questionnaire presented for the fishermen, and the individual respondents are asked to choose the motive that is most appropriate for them for explaining non-compliance behaviour (Table 1 ).
The first motive outlined is based on the premise that economic reasoning is a driving force for non-compliance behaviour. Becker (1968) suggests that utilitymaximizing individuals might find it optimal to commit a criminal offence when the expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legal activity. Economic reasoning is used to explain non-compliance among fishermen (Sutinen and Andersen, 1985; Furlong, 1991) .
The second option build on that technological conditions of different types of fishing gear have implications for fishermen's ability to comply with the regulations, and therefore technological problems as such is explaining the non-compliance behaviour 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 5 (Squires, 1987; Kirkley and Strand, 1988) . The technology of gill-nets, for example, makes it difficult for the fisherman to comply with by-catch regulations and quota regulations (Alam, Ishak, Squires 1996; Thunberg, Bresnyan, Adams 1995) . This is due to the fact that several species are harvested simultaneously, and the gill-net are an inefficient gear for selective harvesting. Non-compliance with by-catch regulations is also a problem for fishermen using trawl (Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003) .
The third is option is that non-compliance by among fellow fishermen is a main motivator for non-compliance of the individual fishermen. The significance of imitating others behaviour is founded on the theory of social behaviour, which emphasises how individual behaviour is influenced by opinions that are formed within a group. In this perspective the opinions of peers has a key influence via the moral context of the actual decisions taken at sea by fishermen Kuperan, 1999, Sutinen and Gauvin, 1988) .
Finally, the bureaucracy of regulations is a suggested as reason for infringement behaviour. The argument is that fishermen's perceptions of legitimacy and fairness of the regulations have an impact on compliance (Tyler, 1990; Jentoft, 2000; Hønneland, 1999; Nielsen, 2003) . In this view, fishermen regard regulations as unfair, bureaucratic, and the law and its institutions as inappropriate, and thus as incentives for non-compliance.
The questionnaire form, where the respondents have to choose between alternative explanations for infringement behaviour, has the advantage that it gives the possibility for performing a systematic empirical analysis. The applied outcome choices for non-compliance denote an exhaustive representation of motives for The model for determining the probability of outcome j is:
where Pr ij (y i = j x i ) denotes the probability that individual i chooses outcome j. x i represents exogenous variables, and j are the parameters to be estimated. The multinomial logit model is based on the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) meaning that the odds ratio between any two choices is unaffected by any other alternative choice.
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The IIA assumption is tested by determining whether the odds ratio between each pair of alternatives is impacted, when observations of other alternative choice are eliminated from the estimation (Long, 1997) . Rejection of the assumption of independence means that biased predictions of probabilities will be obtained by the multinomial logit model.
The impact of individual regressors on the odds ratio is not obtained in (1), but these marginal effects are derived by differentiation:
IV. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
A questionnaire is administered to coastal fishermen holding licenses for catching cod, saithe, and haddock in the coastal fishery. Three hundred randomly selected respondents have answered the questionnaire based on telephone interviews. In order to secure a high likehood an honest responses assurance of individual anonymity and The coastal fishermen in Norway are harvesting several species, and their motives for non-compliance may differ, depending on which species is mainly targeted. For example, the probability that a respondent indicates that regulation is bureaucratic might depend on whether the fisherman is referring to the herring fishery or to the cod fishery. This study focuses on the cod fishery, because this fishery is most valuable in terms of income for the coastal fleet. The 245 respondents analysed are those fishermen indicating that cod is the most important species for them, and that regulation of cod has a larger influence on earnings than any other species.
The summary statistics indicate that the majority of fishermen 63.5% (N=154) identify economic motives for cheating, 18% a technical reason, 6.6% the importance of other fishermen's behaviour, and 12.3% that bureaucracy is their reason for non-compliance ( Table 2 ).
The demographic information indicates that the mean age of the respondents is 52 years, and that they are employed as skippers. The firm-related information reveals that most of the vessels involved operate for about 200 days a year, the average vessel length is 12.8 metres, the average crew size is two, and most companies are individually owned.
Four types of fishing gear are used in the coastal cod fishery: gill-net, Danish seine, long line, and hand jig. The summary statistics shows that hand jig fishermen are less 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A multinomial logit model is employed (Table 3) . Maximum likelihood estimation is employed for estimating the model. The model is based on demographic and firm- The model includes three demographic and firm-related factors: fishermen older than 50 years, vessel's length in metres, and fishermen using hand jig fishing gear. The age of the fishermen is not statistically significant, but grouping the data between fisherman younger and older than 50 years of age is found to be significant. With respect to fishing gear, different gear types have been tested, and the data indicate that the hand jig differs from the other gear types. Several other demographic firmrelated factors are tested but none of them contributed to explaining differences in motives for non-compliance. To this end it is interesting to observe that regional distinctions in motives for non-compliance are not statistically demonstrated in the data. Several of the attitude factors are significant in explaining motives for noncompliance, and these factors are included.
The individual effects of the demographic, firm-related, and attitudes variables are obtained by estimating their marginal effects (Table 4) . Several interesting findings A weak indication is found for that fishermen on larger vessels are less likely to identify bureaucracy as their motive for non-compliance (Table 4 ). The vessel length is, however, statistically insignificant a result that follows due to multicollinearity in the model. Spearman's rank test justifies the significant correlations between vessel length and the following attitude factors: 1) perceived fairness of regulation, 2) perceived probability of a control of papers being conducted, 3) perceived probability that fishermen in general are cheating. Moreover fishermen older than 50 are less likely to identify technical conditions as reason for non-compliance behaviour.
Turning to the attitude factors, the perceived probability that the public managers conduct paper control is perceived being lower among fishermen that are pointing at economic motives for non-compliance compared to fishermen pointing at other motives (Table 4 ). The result confirms that low risk of being controlled creates an economic motive for non-compliance. It is also interesting that fishermen that point at economic motives for non-compliance have a low trust in that regulation is perceived as fair among fishermen in general. The economic-oriented fishermen also anticipate the lowest rate of infringement among fishermen in general. The fishermen that are motivated by economic factors also have a low trust in that increased involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process will reduce non-compliance. The analysis reveals that fishermen that point at the economic motive for non-compliance are more likely to be influenced by increased control measures than fishermen that point at other motives for non-compliances.
Fishermen that point at technical reasons for non-compliance are most negative towards the discard of useful fish. A relatively positive attitude towards regulation is found among fishermen who emphasise technical motives for non-compliance. They are more likely to believe that the regulations are perceived as fair by fishermen, and that there is a higher probability of their papers being inspected than among fishermen who refer to the economic motive. For the authorities, it is important to realise that fishermen who mention technical grounds for non-compliance have a positive attitude to the involvement of fishermen in the regulation process in order to reduce non-compliance.
The fishermen who identify non-compliance among fellow fishermen as a reason for non-compliance are relatively negative to the idea that the authorities are managing the fisheries properly. They believe that non-compliance among fishermen is more common than is thought by the fishermen who pointing to economic and bureaucratic motives for non-compliance. Finally, about 12% of the fishermen point at the regulations as an explanation for non-compliance. These fishermen mainly use Danish seine, long line and gill net, and have the lowest belief that targeting other species than cod might help to reduce non-compliance. The reason might be that to using these types of fishing gear makes it is difficult to catch other species than cod.
One might expect increasing the engagement of fishermen in the regulatory process 
VI. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The paper addresses the influence of various motives for non-compliance among coastal cod fishermen in Norway. The cross-sectional data show that there are various motives for non-compliance among coastal fishermen. The economic motive for non-compliance is important for most fishermen, a finding that is in line with the results of studies performed by Hatcher et al. (2000 Hatcher et al. ( , 2005 , Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) , and Sutinen, Rieser and Gauvin (1990) . Individual economic conditions play an important role in determining the motives that lead to infringement of the regulations. In particular, we find that fishermen who emphasise economic motives believe in a lower likelihood that their papers will be inspected than fishermen who explain non-compliance in terms of non-economic motives. However, increasing fishery control has often been found to be a relatively costly way to achieve compliance (Arnason, Hannesson and Shrank, 2000) . For this reason, increasing the involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process is often suggested as a means of reducing non-compliance. This study indicates that increased involvement of fishermen is likely to have a low probability of success among economy-oriented fishermen, compared to fishermen who identify technical reasons for noncompliance. The result is interesting because scholars have discussed whether means that affect economic incentives, legitimacy or technical problems should be employed to reduce non-compliance. Our findings suggest that involving fishermen in the regulatory process would reduce non-compliance among some fishermen, whereas economic conditions might be expected to influence the majority of fishermen. The study is based on the premise that fishermen cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group, since harvesting patterns differ among fishermen, depending on regional differences in fishing fields and abundance of fish, differences in harvesting gears, which means that perceptions of regulation and motives for non-compliance also differ among fishers. The study shows that type of fishing gear plays a significant role in explaining differences in motives for non-compliance among coastal fishermen. Empirical studies by Squires (1987) , Kirkley and Strand (1988) show that gear is crucial for determining production conditions and the ability to adjust to regulation. The present study shows that catch technology also plays an important role in explaining differences in motives for infringing the regulations.
More specifically, we find that hand jig fishermen are less likely to suggest that bureaucracy and technical problems motivate non-compliance than fishermen who Moreover, fishermen who use other gear types than hand jig indicate that periodic (temporal) regulation is the problem, while hand jig fishermen are relatively more concerned with regulation of minimum fish size. It is also interesting to note that our data do not allow us to establish regional differences in motives for non-compliance. We anticipated that the differences in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Jentoft, 2000) . Finally, it is remarkable that the fishermen who are most sceptical about public control of the fishery are the small minority who identify non-compliance among fellow fishermen as a motive for the non-compliance conducted by them. On second thoughts, however, this result is perhaps not so surprising, in that it suggests that these fishermen would probably recommend greater government control of their fellow fishermen. 2 Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) , Hønneland (1999) provide an enriched theoretical introduction to the literature applied for explaining non-compliance in fishery.
F
3 The applied outcomes are designed to cover the most likely explanations for non-compliance behaviour among
Norwegian costal fishers and for securing accuracy in responses, we have formulated the motives in a wording to be well understood by the fishermen. None of the respondents failed to decide on what motivates noncompliance behaviour. 4 Choices that cannot be ranked in any way are denoted as unordered (see Amemiya, 1981) . 5 An example of rejection of the IIA in the literature is obtained in the red bus/blue bus example, where the odds of transportation choice between car and red bus will be affected when transportation with a blue bus is added as an option. The red and blue buses are naturally close substitutes, and therefore the odds between red bus and car will be reduced, when the blue bus is added as an option (McFadden, 1974) . 6 The Likert variable is used as a device for transforming attitudes with categories like strongly approve, approve, undecided, disapprove, and strongly disapprove into quantitative variable with numeric values between 1 and 5 (Likert, 1932) . 7 A referee suggests that a Hausman test might provide a suitable device for testing the exogeneity of the regressors. The procedure builds on the use of exogenous instruments that are correlated with the regressors without being correlated with the regressant. Unfortunately, those instruments are not at hand, which prevents us from performing the suggested test.
8 33% of the fishermen using hand jig mention that avoiding bycatch in the cod fishery is not easy, for seine and long line the percentages are 65% and 53% respectively. 9 The questionnaire also reveals that periodical regulation is regarded as a problem for 29% of fishermen not using hand jig, but is regarded as a problem by only 9 % of the fishermen using hand jig. On the other hand, while 27% of the hand jig fishermen mention that minimum size is an important regulatory problem, this issue is only mentioned by 7 % of other fishers. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
